Response distortions in self-reported and other-reported measures: Is there light at the end of the tunnel? by Brown, Anna
The UK’s European university
Response distortions in self-reported and 
other-reported measures: 





EunikeWetzel (University of Konstanz)
Jan Böhnke (University of York)
2
Respondent-reported measures
• We ask people to describe themselves or 
others on a set of psychological characteristics
• It may be the easiest and cheapest option out of 
imperfect alternatives 
– What perfect options are there to measure personality?
• It may be the only available option
– What other options are there to measure social 
attitudes?
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We base our scaling on….
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What is response bias?
• The “systematic tendency to respond …. on 
some basis other than the specific item 
content” (Paulhus, 1991)
• Nuisance to measurement of intended constructs
• For example, 
• tendency to use extreme response categories, 
• tendency to agree with statements as presented,
• tendency to give positive appraisal to someone who 
you quite like as a person 
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Types of response biases in self-reports
Independent of item content
• Careless responding
• Not paying attention to 
item content
• Response styles
• Systematic tendencies to 
prefer certain response 
categories over others
Depends on item content
• Socially desirable 
responding
• Tendency to provide 
responses in line with 
social norms
• Unintentional: self 
deception
• Intentional: faking; 
simulation / dissimulation
Types of response biases in reports by others
• The same biases occur as in self-ratings
• Inattentiveness, response styles
• Socially (politically) desirable representation of ratee
• In addition, rater biases
• Leniency / severity
• Halo effect 
– over-generalisation of all behaviours, cognitive bias of 
exaggerated coherence (Thorndike, 1920; Kahneman, 
2011) 
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How prevalent are response biases?
• Inattentive responding is common in basic research and 
social surveys 
• 10-12% in Meade & Craig (2012)
• Response styles are common in all applications
• Up to 20% misreport on reversed items (Swain et al., 2008)
• There are cultural differences (e.g. van Herk et al., 2004)
• Socially desirable responding is common. For the 
intentional component,
• 47% of US applicants admit to exaggerating positive attributes 
and 62% to deemphasising negative (König et al., 2011)
• “Ideal-employee” factor has been consistently found in high 
stakes assessment (Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Klehe et al., 2012)
• Having political goals is common for raters (Murphy et al, 
2004)
• Rater biases are common
• Leniency and halo effects are commonly found (Ng et al., 
2011; Barr & Raju, 2003; Murphy et al., 1993)
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Sources of variance in responses
• The basic measurement model assumes only 
two types of sources influence the response
• True scores – psychological constructs we intend to 
measure
• Random error
• A third source often exists – conscious and 
unconscious response distortions (or biases)
• Systematic error
• If not included in the model, it will mask itself as true 
score
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Why do I worry about response biases?
• Response biases are irrelevant sources of 
variance, and if left uncontrolled, they lead to 
biased test scores
• Test no longer measures what we intended to 
measure (validity is affected)
• Decisions based on test scores that are biased
in any way can lead to
• breach of equal opportunities legislation
• a sense of grievance
• wrong selection decisions
• invalid conclusions in basic research
• Fairness is the ultimate concern
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“Valid” distortions?
• Some argue that biases do not matter if 
criterion-related validity is maintained
• For example, high stakes assessments still predict 
performance (Ones et al., 2007)























• I argue that the key issue is construct validity
• What does our test measure that predicts a criterion? 
– Faking is “saying what you think you ought to say 
rather than what you really want to say. We have a 
word for that – “civilization.”  (Kevin Murphy, in 
Morgeson et al., 2007)
– We may as well admit that when used in high stakes, 
the test measures what people think they are ought to 
say rather than their “personality”
– We may compare who we select on the basis of this 
construct versus the “personality” basis
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What should we do?
• I think that anyone who relies on respondent-
reported measures used in contexts where 
certain biases are prevalent, should be 
concerned
• To remedy the situation, one could
• Detect biases after they have occurred, and adjust 
(correct) the test scores statistically
• Prevent biases before they occur
• Abandon respondent-reported measures and come 
up with something better
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Detection and correction methods
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• Manifest / Observed indices
• Index quantifying the extent of certain bias is created
– Frequency indices for response styles
– Lie / Social Desirability scales
• Observed test score is corrected using the index
– E.g. the regression residual of trait score on the index 
is assumed free of bias (Webster, 1958)
• Latent variables
• Response biases are part of the measurement model 
(via latent traits, or latent classes)
– The extent to which bias affects the measurement 
model fit can be appraised
• Latent (and estimated) trait scores are controlled for 
biases
Bias as latent trait
• We may assume that individuals vary in the 
extent they engage in some biasing 
behaviour, and represent the individual 
differences as a latent factor
• Every response indicates not only its 
dedicated trait(s), but also some biasing 
factor
• The approach has many uses and modifications 
and can be used for modelling many biases (e.g. 
Podsakoff et al., 2003)
• Model identification can be a problem and often 
requires special designs
– For example, having content-independent items 
(or “anchoring vignettes”) just to identify biases
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Example 1: Acquiescence bias
• Acquiescence (or ‘yea’–saying) is the individual tendency 
to agree with items as presented
• Acquiescence bias becomes obvious when some people 
agree to both, positively and negatively worded  items. 
• What should be opposite ends of the same factor, come out 
as two separate factors in EFA
• Personal tendency to acquiesce can be modelled as 
random intercept
• Response for item i and person j
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From: Maydeu-Olivares & Coffman (2006)
• In school children data, RI accounts 
for about 10% of variance in item 
responses
Example 2: “Ideal-employee” factor
• A common factor explaining 
inflated correlations between 
all desirable characteristics 
has been found in applicant 
data (e.g. Schmit & Ryan, 
1993)
• The “ideal-employee” factor 
has varying factor loadings –
the most desirable behaviours 
affected most
• Klehe et al. (2012) showed 
that the relationship between 
ideal-employee factor and job 
performance is explained by 
ability to identify criteria 
(ATIC)
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Illustration: Klehe et al. (2012)
Example 3: Correcting biases in 360 appraisals
• Organizational appraisal data is notorious for 
response biases
• Study by Brown, Inceoglu and Yin (partly 
reported at SIOP 2014)
• Large sample (N=4,675) of self-, peer, boss and 
subordinate assessments
• Inventory of Management Competencies (IMC)
– 16 competencies; 160 items
• Method factor represented non-uniform distortions similar to those of “ideal-
employee” in both self- and other 
assessments
• Explained around 50% of systematic variance 
• Controlling for method factor improved validity 
of competency scores 
– meaningful second-order factor structures
– better inter-rater agreement (ave. ICC = 0.39)
– better convergent correlations with an external 
measure (ave. self = .42; others = .25). 
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• Response process as a decision tree (Böckenholt, 2012)
• 3 pseudo items are created to indicate a 3-step process
IntensityDirectionIndifference
Do I have 
an opinion?
“Unsure”
Am I in 
agreement? Yes










Bias as response process model
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Indifference Direction Intensity
Strongly disagree 0 0 1
Disagree 0 0 0
Unsure 1 - -
Agree 0 1 0
Strongly agree 0 1 1
Example 4: Motivated misreports
• Bockenholt (2014) proposed the “Retrieve-Edit-
Select” decision model to account for self-
enhancement 
• Assumes that editing can happen only in one direction
– For example, people over-report knowledge but do not 
under-report it














Bias as latent class
• We may assume that respondents come from 
several unobserved (latent) classes
• Observed distributions are in fact mixtures of 
unobserved subpopulation distributions
• Model parameters may differ between classes
• Differing thresholds (or intercepts) may indicate 
extreme responding
• Differing factor loadings may indicate different 
psychological constructs underlying responses
– For example, class of individuals endorsing both 
positive and negative items may show all positive factor 
loadings
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Example 5: Extreme responding
• Rasch mixture modelling has been used to 
identify classes of extreme and mid-scale 
respondents
• For instance, Austin et al. (2006) identified 2 classes 
with systematically different item thresholds 
controlling for the latent trait
– Extreme responders (29%) have narrow thresholds 
(endorsing extreme categories is easier)
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Example 6: Faking behaviour
Latent class analysis (LCA)
• 2 classes give excellent 
separation (entropy = .984)
• “Ideal” and “honest” profiles
LCA with known class
• Do the latent classes coincide with the 
2 conditions?
• Latent transition probabilities
• Unfortunately, LCA does not achieve 
such results in real operational data
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• Re-analysis of Brown (2008) study: Instructed faking / Honest conditions
• One job description was used as target; should yield the same ideal profile
• Scale scores (item means) on 16 personality traits were analysed





Limitations of correction methods 
• No real-world data have only one type of bias
• Modelling several biases is problematic
• Special study designs are often required to 
separately identify biases
• Biases are complex to model properly 
• Every model is a great simplification of reality
– For example, latent class models assume that there is 
no individual difference in the extent of bias within 
classes 
• Some biases are much more difficult to deal with 
than others
– For example, faking is a challenge to model because 
the cognitions behind this process vary dramatically 





• Test-taking motivation 
• Lack of motivation increases careless responding
• Motivation to meet the selection criteria increases 
socially desirable responding (Schmit & Ryan, 1993)
• Rater calibration 
• Calibrating own ratings against others reduce leniency
• Rating the same competency for different people, rather 
than different competencies for the same person  
reduce halo (Kahneman, 2011)
• Item wording
• Negatively worded items are difficult to process (“item 
verification difficulty”; e.g. Swain et al., 2008)
• Response format
• Response options must be labelled thoughtfully to avoid 
idiosyncratic interpretation (e.g. Hernandez et al., 2006)
• Forcing choice between items controls for all uniform 
biases (e.g. Cheung & Chan, 2002)
Forced choice
• Comparisons “calibrate” options against each other, 
reducing cognitive biases (Kahneman, 2012)
• Finer differentiation between similar stimuli
• Direct comparison - no rating scale and hence no 
idiosyncratic use of the rating options
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Forced-choice: Mechanism for bias prevention
• According to Thurstone’s (1927) law of 
comparative judgement, respondent chooses 
stimulus with the highest utility (t)
• If tA – tB > 0, then item A is chosen
• If tA – tB < 0, then item B is chosen
• If item utilities are biased with fixed linear 
effects c (arbitrary, c > 0) and d,
• The difference of utilities has the same sign (Brown, 
2010)
• FC format eliminates all multiplicative and 
additive effects acting uniformly within blocks
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Example 7: Preventing biases in 360 appraisals
• Study by Brown, Inceoglu and Yin (continued from 
Example 3)
• Large sample (N=4,675) of self-, peer, boss and 
subordinate assessments 
• Inventory of Management Competencies (IMC)
– 16 competencies; 160 items
• Forced-choice rankings modelled with Thurstonian IRT (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011)
• Estimated trait scores yielded as good construct and 
external validities as the bias-corrected Likert ratings, and 
slightly better rater agreement (ave. ICC = 0.41).
• This is impressive considering the lower reliability of FC scores 
• The multidimensional forced-choice response format is an 
effective bias prevention method in self- and others- ratings
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Limitations of prevention methods
• Some prevention methods have very small effects
• Prevention methods seem to be most effective 
against unmotivated biases 
• (which probably emerge due to us creating bad 
questionnaires in the first place)
• But when test developers go against human 
willpower, things get tough
• Working with forced choice taught me that it is effective 
for prevention of response styles, leniency and halo
– Recommended in cross-cultural research and 
assessments by others
• But if someone wants to misrepresent their personality, 
they can do it, whether you are forcing choice or not
– I can always swap my true choices to misrepresent myself
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Is there light at the 
end of the tunnel?
Some thoughts on the effectiveness 
of the proposed methods and 
challenges ahead
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So is there light at the end of the tunnel?
• Fighting biases can be very frustrating
• We can continue with developing detection and 
correction methods
• Fast estimation methods and advancing 
psychometrics will help
• But in my opinion, we should focus on 
prevention
• What is the point in investing all efforts in fancy 
models, and continue using poorly designed tests?
• It is not enough to manipulate factors with small 
effects on biases
• It is time to think outside the box, and be critical 
of established practices
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A question to you
• A question to those who use abstract rating 
options such as 
• Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor 
disagree / agree / strongly agree
• If you do not want the responses to be affected 
by the tendency to agree, or the strength of 
agreement, why ask about agreement at all?
• Additional factor is introduced 
• Why not use response categories that 
represent intervals on the trait of interest?
In social conversation, how do you usually behave?
talkative – an easy talker – talk when necessary –
prefer listening – refrain from talking
(McDonald, 1999)
32
And another question to you
• A question to those who use personality 
measures for selection, and feel faking is 
normal because it reflects the adherence to 
social norms
• Why don’t you just ask the respondents: 
• What kind of person do you think we would like to 
recruit? (the “ideal-employee” image as they see it)
AND
• How motivated are you to get this job?
• Taken together, the ability to identify criteria (ATIC) and motivation presumably explain a lot 
of variance in job performance 
• And there is little reason to fake the above measures
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A Plea for Process in Personality Prevarication
• “a focus on the response process that 
test takers go through will accelerate 
our understanding of faking behavior” 
(Kuncel, Goldberg & Kiger, 2011)
• This is true for all biases
• If we understand the process, we can 
• (At least) detect and correct it better
• Prevent the negative impact of faking by 
creating better assessments
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It is time for qualitative research
• I have been carrying out research of test taker 
cognitions in high stakes assessments 
• Qualitative interviews
• Free descriptions of motivations and cognitions after 
taking a personality tests for selection
• It made me realise that 
• the prevalence of faking is high (and higher than 
estimated in the literature), 
• the motivation and cognitions are complex and 
different from person to person,
• the problem is more serious than most admit, 





? When facing two equally 
desirable items, the 
respondent will fall back on 
true response (Gordon, 1951). 
 “I found this [FC] questionnaire 
more friendly because all 
statements were about good 
things, so I could relax and think 
about my personality”
FC facilitates faking
? Direct comparison of items 
facilitate acute differentiation of 
their desirability levels 
(Feldman & Corah, 1960).
 “…it was hard to chose which 
option was really me and tended 
to go with the one that my 




• Response biases matter because they can 
distort the true scores on attributes of interest
• Construct validity is affected
• Detection / correction and prevention methods 
exist that can help, but there are many 
problems
• A more critical and fresh approach is needed 
• Investing time in creating a new type of assessment 
rather than in fixing problems in the old one
• Understanding the response process is crucial 
• in detecting and correcting the response biases, 
• in preventing response biases from occurring by 
creating assessments more resistant to them (or 
even free from them)
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